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Abstract.  This paper tries a conceptual framing of the issue of 
financial stability in economic theory and also to identify solutions to 
address episodes of financial instability. An essential reference is 
Minsky's financial instability hypothesis, which argues that a 
fundamental feature of the financial system is that it swings between 
robustness and fragility and these pendulum swings are an integral part 
of the process that generates the business cycle. Studies show that the 
effects of banking crises on economic activity are important both in 
magnitude and duration. Recently, macroprudential policy stood out as a 
central pillar in promoting financial stability in a broad sense. Regarding 
specific objectives of macroprudential policy, the prevalent vision refers 
to limiting systemic risk and macroeconomic costs of financial crises, but 
there are also important nuances. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The origin of the macroprudential term dates back to the late 70s. The 
first occurrence is in the minutes of a meeting of the Cooke Committee in 1978 
(the current Basel Committee on Banking Supervision). The context in which it 
was used targeted the fears of macroeconomic and financial stability 
implications of rapid growth in lending to developing countries. 
The first reference in an official document was in 1986 in a BIS report 
which explores the fears of financial innovation, in which the macroprudential 
policy is seen as promoting “the safety and soundness of the financial system as 
a whole and the payment mechanisms”. 
A milestone in the evolution of this concept is the year 2000, when at the 
International Conference of Banking Supervisors, Andrew Crockett (2000), the 
BIS general manager, emphasized in his speech the need to strengthen the 
macroprudential dimension of supervision and regulation to ensure financial 
stability as a complement for the microprudential approach. A macroprudential 
dimension was highlighted on mutual amplification from the financial system 
and the real economy, which is now known as the pro-cyclicality of the 
financial system. 
 
2. The macroprudential policy objectives  
 
Until the financial crisis, in the literature on monetary policy there was 
some convergence of ideas regarding the objective to be followed, respectively 
price stability on a time horizon of two years or if there is a dual mandate, as in 
the FED case, also an objective to maximize the employment level. 
But in the late 90s there was also a different view, claiming that 
authorities could use monetary policy to prevent the accumulation of 
imbalances in the financial system. There are works that have dealt with how 
monetary policy should respond to asset price changes. In essence, the 
argument was that, in some circumstances, reasons of financial stability may 
lead the central bank to deviate somewhat from short-term inflation target by 
raising interest rates higher than justified by inflation trajectory, to reduce the 
probability of future financial instability and, hence the inflation variability on 
longer time horizons, Kent and Lowe (1997) argued theoretically rigorous this 
vision. Okina et al. (2000) argues in favor of policy rate increases for financial 
stability purposes, based on the Japanese experience of the 80s. Goodheart 
(1995) points out, in the context of analyzing suitable indicators to measure Macroprudential policy and financial stability 
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inflation, the need to take into account the behavior of asset prices in setting 
monetary policy. 
Literature on macroprudential policy appears not to be close to 
approaching broad consensus regarding the objectives, as was the case for 
monetary policy before the financial crisis. 
Borio (2003) was among the first to deal in detail with the 
macroprudential issues, arguing the need to strengthen banking supervision and 
regulation to combat financial instability, based on the financial crisis 
experience of 90s in Scandinavian and Asian countries. This paper defines and 
compares the size of macroprudential and microprudential nuances that 
inevitably coexist in financial regulation and supervision (Table 1). 
Particularities of the two approaches are evaluated in terms of objectives, 
risk model and interconnections in the system, as follows: i) in terms of 
prudential policy, the immediate objective is to avoid problems at individual 
financial institutions, the major objective being protection of depositors and 
investors; the risk is considered exogenous – meaning independent of the 
individual behavior of individual agents and interconnections and common 
exposures between financial institutions are irrelevant, while ii) at 
macroprudential level, the immediate objective is to limit instability in the 
system, the major objective being to avoid costs associated macroeconomic 
financial instability; the risk is endogenous – influenced by the collective 
behavior of financial institutions, and linkages and common exposures among 
financial institutions are very important to the system. 
In a broad sense, it is accepted in the literature that the overall objective 
of macroprudential policy is to promote financial stability. With regard to the 
specific objectives of macroprudential policy, the dominant view is to limit the 
risks and costs of financial crises, but this view must be nuanced.  
 
Table 1 
Macro-versus microprudential perspective 
  Macroprudential Microprudential
Immediate objective To limit instability at system level To limit problems at institutions’ level 
Ultimate objective  To avoid macroeconomic costs 
associated with financial instability 
Consumer protection 
(investor/depositor ) 
Risk characterization Endogenous (dependent on 
collective behavior) 
Exogenous (independent from the 
behavior of individual agents) 
Correlation and common 
exposures across institutions 
Important Irrelevant
Calibration of prudential filters  Targets risks at system level Targets risks at institutions’ level 
Source: Borio (2003). 
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Borio and Drehmann (2009) are among the exponents of this view, 
considering that macroprudential policy intention is to limit the risks that lead 
to episodes of financial instability, which in turn require significant 
macroeconomic costs. The foundation of their vision has the starting point in 
the differentiation outlined above, between micro and macroprudential 
perspectives (Table 1). 
A more detailed description, also in line with this vision, belongs to 
Caruana (2010) (BIS general manager), that frames explicitly the macro-
prudential policy issues in both a temporal and a cross-sectional dimension, 
considering that the objective is “to reduce systemic risk by explicitly 
addressing the interconnections between financial institutions and their 
common exposures and the pro-cyclicality of the financial system”. 
 
3. Minsky's financial instability hypothesis 
 
The conceptual approach of the financial stability issue is the starting 
point for Minsky's financial instability hypothesis. This theory came to present 
only in the context of the recent financial crisis which followed the period of 
the Great moderation and as the need to conceptually explain how it got to this 
point. 
The general form of this theory appeared in 1974. In essence, Minsky 
argued that a fundamental characteristic of the economy is that the financial 
system swings between robustness and fragility and these pendulum swings are 
an integral part of the process that generates the business cycle. 
Minsky identifies three types of income-debt relations for economic units: 
traditional, speculative and Ponzi. In the first case, businesses can meet 
contractual payment obligations through cash flow (revenue expected) it 
generates. Speculative agents honor only interest and roll over the principal 
amount (often governments, banks and corporations that issue bonds), while 
Ponzi agents can not cover from income any interest, not even the principal, 
and are being forced to sell assets or to additional borrow in order to repay 
older debt. As long as traditional income-debt relations are dominant, the 
economy tends to stability and equilibrium. In contrast, the more weight the 
other types (speculative and Ponzi) of relationships increases, the probability 
that the economy may have been deviated from equilibrium is higher. 
Briefly the theory published in 1992 is stated as follows: i) the first 
theorem of the financial instability hypothesis is that the economy has financing 
regimes under which it is stable and financing regimes in which it is unstable, 
ii) the second theorem states that, over periods of prolonged prosperity, the Macroprudential policy and financial stability 
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economy goes from financial relations that ensure stability to financial 
relationships that contribute to system instability. This system transition 
involves bubbles in asset prices. 
Moreover, Minsky described the paradox of disintermediation, in which 
the rational behavior of firms and households needed for steady economic 
recovery leads to increased economic recession.   
Minsky's analysis framework envisages the development of instability in 
two phases, namely a primary cycle and a super-cycle. The primary Minsky 
cycle refers to the development of funding arrangements and captures the 
appearance of financial instability at the balance sheet level of firms and 
households. This cycle goes through the three phases mentioned above: it starts 
with traditional financing,  in which the expected income of the borrowers are 
sufficient to cover the interest and the principal of the loan, then goes to the 
speculative finance stage that assumes that incomes only cover the interest,  and 
lastly to Ponzi finance in which the incomes are insufficient to cover interest 
and the debtors depend on capital gains to honor their obligations. 
The primary Minsky cycle offers a psychological perspective on the 
economic cycle. Businesses are becoming more optimistic due to the economic 
stability; this leads to a more optimistic assessment of the valued assets and of 
the associated income, with direct effects on accepting raising risk levels with 
the belief that positive trends will be perpetuated. This optimism feeds all 
market participants, both creditors and debtors, and gradually leads to the 
abandonment of market discipline. Most relevant evidences are: i) during the 
90s it was spoken about "the new economy" and about "the economic cycle 
death" when it was believed of entering a phase of constant productivity 
growth, and ii) in 2000 period when it was spoken about the "Great 
Moderation" claiming that central banks have tamed the business cycle by 
improving monetary policy, based on a superior understanding of theoretical 
economy. This optimism included even the policy makers and those responsible 
for market regulation. An example is the current Fed chairman Ben Bernanke, 
who stated in 2004 the theoretical bias toward the hypothesis of Great 
Moderation theory. 
Empirically, the model proposed by Minsky's through financial instability 
hypothesis, explains in an elegant way the economic and financial 
developments of recent decades. Past 30 years have witnessed three economic 
cycles in the US, namely 1981-1990, 1991-2001 and 2002-2009, each of them 
being marked by a primary cycle where borrowers and lenders assumed 
increasing financial risks. Moreover, the entire period was marked by a super Bogdan Chiriacescu 
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cycle characterized by financial innovation and financial deregulation. So, 
gradually the financial instability increased at both individual and systemic 
level, through increased lending and declining risk aversion, based on an 
institutional protection of a drifted system. 
The solution proposed by Minsky for preventing problems the global 
economy now confronts with, and generally preventing financial instability, 
refers to strengthening the supervisory and regulatory policies, which are 
currently underway. 
 
4. The financial instability cost 
 
The problem of avoiding and protecting the economy from financial 
instability episodes is most eloquently captured by studies that analyze the costs 
they cause and that are generally important in terms of production loss, through 
both direct and indirect effects. Reinhert and Rogoff (2008) show that, 
compared to the main episodes of systemic banking crises in the past, the 
average real GDP decreased by 9.3 percent and that these episodes of recession 
last for about two years. From this point of view, according to the National 
Bank Annual Report (2000) estimations, the banking crisis in Romania, from 
the late 90, seems to fit perfectly into this pattern. 
Joyce and Nabar (2009) suggest that the effects of financial crises on 
GDP are, however, only short-term consequences, because often the 
manifestation of a crisis is accompanied by currency depreciation, which 
induces effects of price competitiveness for domestic goods, and so by boosting 
exports it engages the halting of the economic decline. Studying a sample of 26 
emerging countries from 1976 to 2002, the authors show that in fact the 
consequences of banking crisis are more serious by the fact that they produce 
persistent negative effect on investment, which means that the economic 
recovery is unsustainable and the medium term prospects are not favorable. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
The most important steps that have been made so far refer to the 
rethinking of the regulatory and supervisory framework of the financial system 
through Basel III reform package and widening the existing institutional 
framework through creating bodies with responsibility for macro-prudential 
policies in the EU. 
The global standard reform package on the capital and liquidity 
requirements for financial institutions, Basel III, has two important dimensions: Macroprudential policy and financial stability 
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i) microprudential pillar, which is not new, but it’s meant to be a deeper treat 
for individual risk of banks and ii) a new macroprudential pillar, which aims to 
address holistically the risk issue, within the entire banking system. Besides 
increasing the minimum level of capital, the novelty of the proposed measures 
include: i) imposing countercyclical capital buffers that banks should further 
constitute depending on  the business cycle phases and ii) limiting excessive 
debt, by introducing a maximum leverage. A special attention is given to the 
financial institutions of  systemically importance operating across borders, main 
proposals addressed to those referring to capital and liquidity requirements 
additional to other institutions,  that don’t show systemic risk,  and emergency 
plans in case of failure, so that to avoid using public funds for resolving 
problems. 
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